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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§78A-3-lO2(3)O),78A-4-lU3(2)0. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES A N D STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 -^i -i.nl court abuse its discrctioi i I in; :i :t pi n si ini it t I 'tal 1 1 i Ci *. 1- '. 
37(g), it imposed sanctions against the Appellants Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr ("Mr. La 
Marr" or "Cactus Jack")., KI , Mac :! unery Pty, I td ("KK Max: :hinery"), and DayNight, T T C 
("DayNight") (collectively referred to herein as "Appellants" or the "DayNight Parties") for 
destroying W. Cory Rowe's ("Mr. Rowe")1 laptop computer and hard drive, which were 
evidence cv /i-Light, Inc.'s (^ \\l< tbilu.'hf1} trade sa*ui n -. •. - < ••••ns? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's discovery sanction decision is reviewed for a 
clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick v. Bullougb AbatementL////;, 2( )08 I "" I ' S \ |^ 23, I'*'' l\ xl (>57. 
Preservation: Appellants preserved the issue in the DayNight Parties' Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant Mobilight, Inc.'s M i' -n f< >r Terminating Sanctions, (R. 561.) 
I - , 
judgment on Mobilight's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth 
Claims for Relief in — • ''oimterclaim an*, i -.- • .r.-\ i • :.;v»int 
when Appellant .a Marr an.: \ r i\. >we intentionally destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop 
computer and hard drive, which were evidence central t< > Mobilight's trade secret-related 
claims? 
1
 Mr. Rowe had been a party to Appellants' appeal, but his appeal was dismissed with 
prejudice bv order of this C< >urt on /April 29, 2010, as reflected in the record. 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's discovery sanction decision is reviewed for a 
clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick, f^ 23. 
Preservation: Appellants preserved the issue in the DayNight Parties' Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant Mobilight, Inc.'s Motion for Terminating Sanctions. (R. 561.) 
Issue 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it awarded final judgment to 
Mobilight in the amount of $120,692.07 for Mobilight's reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred with respect to its default judgment against the Appellants? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's award of attorney's fees is reviewed for a clear 
abuse of discretion. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation: Appellants preserved the issue in the DayNight Parties' Memorandum 
in Opposition to Mobilight, Inc.'s Motion for Final Entry of Default Judgment. (R. 726.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. A N D RULES 
A. Statutes: The following Utah statute is reproduced in the Addendum: The Utah 
Uniform Trade Secret Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-1, et seq. 
B. Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(g): 
Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to 
take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers 
with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in 
violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a 
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 37(b)(2): 
b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered 
under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a 
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
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order to provide or pernlit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of thi^ 
rule or Rule 35 , , unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the cou1; w • 
which the action is pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are just, including 
the following: 
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the purposes of 
the action in accordance with tlR claii11 of the party obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or o[ i mg designated clai 
defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, 
dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against 
the disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney 
fees, caused by the failure; 
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, otl i< ;i t l =11 i a t i c i l< :i t.< • vi lbi :i tit r ' a \. 1 i ' • leal or 
mental examination, as contempt of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
s i A. r;E,.i\ IEN roF ;n m CASE 
Nature of the Case: Mobilight brought this action as a counterclaim and third party 
complaint involving misappropriation of its trade secrets and confidential proprietary 
information which Appellants used to get into the light tower manufacturing business and 
directly compete with Mobilight. At the very beginning of the case, Mr. La Marr and Mr. 
R .' A " ""( * in it'i "i i t i ' ' i l a l l v It "isii )• '< ' d i v l i R ' : , < ""s la] > to] ) con. i.| in it< "t ai :i< 1 1 lat d dt i •< ' tl lat a n itaii icd 
evidence of the misappropriation of Mobilight's trade secrets. 
Coi u se of Pi < :i ceedii lgs ai id Disp ::: sitic i I Bek : r: Da "I \igl it stat t< :d the action by 
filing a complaint for trespass against Mobilight on July 25, 2008. (R. 1.) On .August 22, 
2008, Mobilight filed a counterclaim against DayNight and third-party claims against Mr. T a 
Marr, Air. Kow t. icry, for the mi^r- • lobiiigiu s ti\i. ;• M crets 
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and confidential proprietary information, breach of contract, conversion, and injunctive 
relief. (R. 46.) Mobilight also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction on August 22, 2008. (R. 117.) After an oral argument hearing on 
September 3, 2008 (R. 313), the district court granted Mobilight's motion for a temporary 
restraining order on September 5, 2008 (R. 321), and on September 16, 2008, the court 
formalized in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Temporary Restraining Order. 
(R. 399.) After evidentiary hearings held on October 7, 8, and 30, 2008 (R. 483, 484, 554), 
the court granted Mobilight a preliminary injunction against the Appellants on November 
14,2008. (R. 583.) 
On October 15, 2008, Mobilight filed its motion for sanctions regarding the 
intentional destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop computer and hard drive. (R. 486.) The court 
granted Mobilight's motion for sanctions on March 24, 2009, and granted Mobilight default 
judgment on its First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth claims for 
relief. (R. 656.) The court later granted Mobilight's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment as 
provided in the court's Memorandum Decision dated November 10, 2009. (R. 831.) (Copy 
in Addendum.) The trial court granted Rule 54(b) certification to the judgment. (R. 832.) 
The trial court also found in the Memorandum Decision on November 10, 2009, that "the 
apportioned amount of fees sought is appropriate and necessarily incurred in furtherance of 
Mobilight's trade secret-related claims, and that the amount of fees and costs requested is 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the case and the scope of the litigation." (R. 833.) 
The Final Judgment was entered in the Registry of Judgments on November 18, 2009. (R. 
840.) Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on December 10, 2009. (R. 847.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Third-party defendant and appellant Paul La Marr, a /k /a "Cactus Jack," is general 
manager of third-party defendant KK Machinery. (Tr. 586, f^ 9.) Mr. La Marr is also a 
member and general manager of DayNight, LLC. (R. 586, f^ 9.) Mr. La Marr photographed 
Mobilight's process of manufacturing its light towers. (R. 587, j^ 14.) 
After Mr. Rowe left his employment with Mobilight, he began work officially for KK 
Machinery and/or DayNight in a position or nearly identical to or nearly identical to his 
former Operations Manager position with Mobilight. (R. 588, j^ 20.) 
Mobilight holds trade secrets as defined in the Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act, § 13-
24-1, et seq., and paragraph 2a of the Property Protection Agreements. (R. 593, ^ f 31.) 
Mr. Rowe, Mr. La Marr, and DayNight's source of suppliers is from Mobilight's confidential 
information. (R. 589, ^ 26.) 
On June 2, 2008, Mr. Rowe was requested to return the hard drive from his laptop 
computer that contained Mobilight's confidential proprietary information, including 
information regarding Mobilight's customers, vendors, costs, pricing, and technical 
information regarding Mobilight's production methods. (R. 588, J^ 21.) Mr. Rowe was even 
offered a brand new hard drive so that he could keep the computer itself. (Id.) However, 
Mr. Rowe replied that he "would have to check with Karl [Prall] and Cactus Jack of KK 
Machinery." Instead of responding to Mobilight's request, Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe 
destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop computer. (R. 658.) The trial court found that Mr. Rowe's 
2
 While Mobilight agrees with much of the Appellants' Statement of Facts, Mobilight 
expressly does not agree with paragraphs 7, 19, 23, 24, 26, 33, 38, and 58 of Appellants' 
Statement of Facts. Mobilight sets out here an abbreviated Statement of Facts that more 
fully reflects the record in the trial court as to the pertinent facts. 
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refusal to return the hard drive from his laptop computer which contained Mobilight's 
confidential, proprietary trade secret information supports the reasonable inference and 
finding that Mr. Rowe intended to wrongfully use and/or did wrongfully use Mobilight's 
protected information. (Id.) 
On July 30, 2008, while video recording the destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop 
computer, Mr. La Marr stated that he and Mr. Rowe were "about to destroy any final, 
potential harmful evidence that might link us to any sort of lawsuit to Mobi-Light 
regarding their concerns about intellectual property." (R. 662.) (Emphasis in original.) 
Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe "chose to willfully and in bad faith destroy the laptop in 
order to permanently deprive Mobi-Light and the trial court of the evidence contained on 
the laptop. (R. 662.) The destruction of the laptop computer will cause substantial prejudice 
to Mobi-Light because the destruction of the evidence contained on the hard drive of the 
laptop will leave the jury to speculate regarding the nature and extent of Mobi-Light's 
confidential information contained on the hard drive and whether that information was 
actually being accessed, transferred and/or used. (R. 662.) The evidence on the laptop 
"goes to the heart of Mobi-Light's claims and is the central and most direct evidence of 
DayNight's and the third-party defendants' alleged wrongdoing." (R. 663.) The intentional 
destruction of the laptop computer permanently deprives Mobilight and the trial court of the 
evidence contained on the laptop computer. (R. 588, [^ 22.) 
The trial court granted Mobilight a Preliminary Injunction against DayNight, Mr. 
Rowe, Mr. La Marr, and KK Machinery on November 14, 2008, enjoining them from using 
or disclosing any of Mobilight's confidential proprietary information and enjoining Mr. 
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Rowe and Mr. La Marr from working in any capacity for the KK Machinery/DayNight light 
tower joint venture. (R. 598-599.) The trial court also granted Mobilight its attorney's fees 
and costs incurred in obtaining the Temporary Restraining Order dated September 16, 2008, 
as well as with respect to the Preliminary Injunction as provided in the Utah Uniform Trade 
Secret Act and the respective written agreements between the DayNight defendants and 
Mobilight. (R. 599.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Mobilight default judgment as 
the sanction for the intentional destruction of the computer hard drive evidence. Appellants 
had a duty to preserve evidence, and the video of the destruction unequivocally confirms 
that Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe knew they were destroying "harmful evidence" and did so to 
take unfair advantage of Mobilight in the litigation. The conduct was subject to sanction 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(g) even though there was no pre-existing discovery order and even 
though Appellants had not previously engaged in a pattern of destroying evidence. The 
intentional destruction of evidence deprives Mobilight and the court of the central evidence 
to Mobilight's trade secrets-based case and is a direct affront to the justice system. Due to 
the Appellants' willfulness and bad faith, default judgment is the only appropriate remedy. 
Neither did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Mobilight judgment for its 
attorney's fees and costs. Mobilight apportioned its attorney's fees and costs request as 
required, and the amount of its attorney's fees and costs were reasonable in light of the 
complexity of the litigation and the results achieved. For these reasons, Mobilight 
respectfully requests that the Final Judgment of the Third District Court be affirmed. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting Mobilight default judgment 
as sanctions for the intentional destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop computer. Appellants also 
argue that the trial court erred in awarding Mobilight attorney's fees and costs. The record 
confirms that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in granting Mobilight default 
judgment for Appellants' intentional destruction of evidence. Nor did the trial court abuse 
its discretion in granting Mobilight final judgment for its award of attorney's fees and costs. 
A trial court's remedy for discovery abuses is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2008 UT App 31, \ 9, 177 P.3d 629. In applying the 
abuse of discretion standard, a district court is given "a great deal of latitude in determining 
the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court business" because the district court 
judge "is in the best position to evaluate the status of his [or her] cases, as well as the 
attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties." Bode 11 Construction Company v. Robbins, 2009 
UT 52, H 35 (2009), 215 P.3d 933, quoting Morton v. ConflBaking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 
(Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a district court will be determined to 
have "abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to impose only if there is either an 
erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for the [district] court's ruling." Bode/I, |^ 
35, quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 274 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Appellate review of a district court's imposition of sanctions follows a two-step 
process. "First, we ensure that the district court has made a factual finding that the party's 
behavior merits sanctions. Second, once the factual finding has been made, we will only 
disturb the sanction if'abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown."' Kilpatrick v. Bullough 
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Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, P23, 199 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008), quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 274 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a general rule, district courts 
are granted a great deal of deference in selecting discovery sanctions, and sanctions are 
overturned only in cases evidencing a clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick, |^ 23 (citation and 
quotation omitted). An abuse of discretion may be demonstrated by showing that the 
district court relied on "an erroneous conclusion of law" or that there was "no evidentiary 
basis for the trial court's ruling." Id. (citation omitted). Deferential review recognizes that 
"trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery process." Id., quoting 
Utah Dep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
I. T H E DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
W H E N IT IMPOSED DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST T H E 
APPELLANTS FOR DESTROYING EVIDENCE CENTRAL TO 
MOBILIGHT'S CLAIMS. 
Appellants do not seriously contest that their intentional destruction of the laptop 
computer warrants sanctions under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(g). Instead, the Appellants argue that 
the default judgment sanction issued against them is too harsh, and in trying to advance their 
appeal, refer to procedural standards that do not apply to application of Rule 37(g). 
The Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion because it "lacked an 
evidentiary basis." (Appellants' Brief at 16.) To the contrary, the district court had the 
benefit of direct evidence in the form of a video of W. Cory Rowe and Appellant Paul 
"Cactus Jack" La Marr showing them destroying Mr. Rowe's laptop computer, a computer 
which they identified in the video to be "harmful evidence." The trial court noted that the 
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existence of the video evidence showed Mr. Rowe's and Mr. La Marr's disregard for the 
court and the judicial process. (R. 663.) 
Appellants also argue that the district court abused its discretion because it did not 
explicitly find that the Appellants acted "willfully" in destroying Mr. Rowe's laptop 
computer. (Appellant's Brief at 16.) There is no requirement for a district court to make any 
determination about the "willfulness" of a party's behavior under Rule 37(g). Regardless, 
because the district court ruled that the Appellants acted "purposely" and "intentionally" in 
destroying the laptop computer, the district court found that the Appellants held the 
requisite culpability to warrant the sanction of default judgment.3 (R. 663.) 
Finally, Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion because the 
Appellants did not engage in a "consistent pattern" of disregarding court orders or discovery 
requirements. (Id. at 17.) As stated in Rule 37(g), a district court's sanctioning power under 
Rule 37(g) reflects the court's inherent authority, and the rule does not require that the 
district court first have issued any orders regarding discovery before it may sanction a party 
for destroying evidence. For these reasons and those outlined below, the district court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
A. T H E R E IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT T H E DISTRICT 
COURT'S SANCTION OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
3
 "The willfulness standard in this context is low. Willfulness has been interpreted to mean 
"any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance. No wrongful 
intent need be shown."' Welsh v. Hospital Corp. <?/Utah, 2010 UT App. 171, \ 12, 235 P.3d 
791, quoting Utah Dep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4,8 (Utah 1995). 
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In the preliminary injunction hearing on October 7 and 8, 2008, the trial court viewed 
the July 30, 2008, DVD video Mr. La Marr made of the destruction of the laptop. (R. 482.) 
The statements of Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe on the video included the following: 
1. Mr. La Marr clearly stated in the July 30, 2008 video as follows: 
"We are about to destroy any final, potential harmful evidence that 
might link us to any sort of lawsuit to Mobilight regarding their 
concerns about intellectual property. We have decided we have not 
used Cory's laptop. We have not in any way used that information that 
he has gleaned from Mobilight. We think it is best to destroy it." 
(R. 492.) 
2. Further memorializing their intention to destroy evidence, verbalizing their 
understanding of the gravity of what they were doing, and emphasizing their callous 
disregard for Mobilight's rights and complete disrespect of the judicial system, Mr. La Marr 
and/or Mr. Rowe further stated in the July 30, 2008, video, after they broke the computer 
into pieces, and smashed the hard drive with a hammer, as follows: 
"Now, let's package it up and send it to Mobilight." 
"The laptop has been destroyed. Fully." 
"OK. If this gets us into trouble, I hope we're prison buddies." 
"The information is destroyed." 
(R. 492-493.) 
The video of the destruction of the laptop computer and the statements of Mr. La 
Marr and Mr. Rowe recorded in the video, during and immediately after the destruction of 
the computer, provided ample and direct evidence for the district court to base its default 
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judgment sanction upon. The Appellants do not offer any cogent argument as to why they 
believe there was not a sufficient evidentiary basis for the district court's sanction. 
The district court explicitly found that there was "direct evidence" of the intentional 
destruction of the computer evidence, and that said intentional destruction of evidence 
significantly prejudiced Mobilight. In its Memorandum Decision dated March 29, 2009, the 
trial court stated as follows: 
In this case, there is direct evidence of Mr. Rowe's and Cactus Jack's intentional 
destruction of relevant evidence for the purpose of hiding potential damaging 
information. Further, there is a significant level of prejudice to Mobi-Light because 
the evidence at issue goes to the heart of Mobi-Light's claims and is the central and 
most direct evidence of DayNight's and the third-party defendants' alleged 
wrongdoing. Next, the actual videotaped destruction of the evidence creates an 
extraordinary circumstance which demonstrates Mr. Rowe's and Cactus Jack's 
disregard for the Court and the judicial process. Considering these factors in their 
totality, the Court is persuaded that the level of culpability is such that Default 
Judgment is warranted and that a less drastic sanction would not be appropriate 
under these unique circumstances. Accordingly, Mobi-Light's Motion for Sanctions 
is granted. 
(R. 663.) In short, because there was video evidence of the computer's destruction and 
concurrent statements from Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe as to their state of mind at the time 
of the destruction, the district court had an extraordinary evidentiary basis upon which to 
issue its default judgment sanction. 
B. T H E DISTRICT COURT DID N O T HAVE TO F I N D EVIDENCE OF 
WILLFULLNESS, BAD FAITH, FAULT, PERSISTENT DILATORY 
TACTICS, OR REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF COURT ORDERS AS A 
PREDICATE TO IMPOSING DEFAULT JUDGMENT U N D E R 
RULE 37(g). 
Contrary to the Appellants' argument, Rule 37(g) does not necessarily require a trial 
court to find evidence of "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics" predicate 
to imposing sanctions for destruction of evidence. Rule 37(g) contains no requirement that 
17 
a trial court must find that a party acted with "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent 
dilatory tactics" before it may impose sanctions for destruction of evidence. Rule 37(g)'s 
reference to Rule 37(b)(2)?s laundry list of possible sanctions as punishment for violation of 
Rule 37(g) does not also mean that caselaw interpreting application of Rule 37(b)(2), that 
requires that there be evidence of "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics," 
applies to enforcement of Rule 37(g). Rule 37(g) provides as follows: 
Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the 
court to take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, 
alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, electronic data or 
other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may 
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically 
stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an 
electronic information system. 
Rule 37(g) contains no language referring to a party's state of mind or intention with respect 
to what it does to alter or destroy evidence. Rule 37(g)'s reference to Subdivision (b)(2) is 
for the limited purpose of referring the trial court to the list of available sanctions under that 
rule, and Rule 37(g)'s reference to Subdivision (b)(2) does not make application of Rule 37(g) 
ipso facto impliedly dependent upon restrictions found in case law regarding the application of 
the sanctions listed under Subdivision (b)(2). Subdivision (b)(2) deals with various other 
orders. 
Rule 37(g) specifies that a court has an inherent power to take "any action authorized 
by Subdivision (b)(2) [.]" A court's authority to sanction contemptuous conduct is both 
statutory and inherent. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, f36 (2005), 123 P.3d 416 (detailing the 
procedures governing contempt) and In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217, 224 (Utah 1913) 
("It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction possess certain 
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inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these are the power to punish for 
con tempt . . . . " ) . 
The list of sanctions in Subdivision (b)(2) to Rule 37, including the provision for the 
sanction of default judgment, include the following: 
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated 
claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by 
default against the disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney fees, caused by the failure; 
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical 
or mental examination, as contempt of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
Rule 37(g) became effective in 2007. The minutes of the Utah Supreme Court 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure ("Advisory Committee") that drafted 
and adopted the rule do not reflect that a party's state of mind or intent should be 
considered in applying the rule. The Advisory Committee discussed in its first meeting 
regarding proposed Rule 37(g) that a trial court has "inherent authority" to address 
spoliation, but that there was need for a supplementation of that authority to give trial courts 
and practitioners a guide.4 
4
 Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure February, 22, 
2006, Minutes at pp. 1-2, available online at 
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The Minutes to the Advisory Committee's April 26, 2006, discussions regarding 
proposed Rule 37(g) confirm that "The committee supported the suggestion adding that the 
reference to subsection (b)(2) is meant to be inclusive of the subparagraphs of (b)(2)"5 It is 
evident that the Advisory Committee did not intend Rule 37(g)'s reference to Subdivision 
(b)(2) to refer to the first main paragraph of Subdivision (b)(2), which pertains to sanctions 
in the event a party fails to obey an order under Rule 16(b), Rule 30(b)(6), Rule 31(a), Rule 
37(a), or Rule 35. See Rule 37(b)(2).6 Subdivision (b)(2) of Rule 37 does not mention or 
refer to Subdivision (g) of Rule 37. Therefore, it is clear that when a trial court considers 
imposing sanctions under Rule 37(g), the trial court is not required to apply case law, 
interpreting those sections of Rule 37(b)(2) requiring a court to find "willfulness, bad faith, 
fault or persistent dilatory tactics" referred to in Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, [^ 16, 981 
P.2d 407 (Utah 1999), as argued by Appellants. 
Finally, contrary to Appellants' argument, there is no requirement in the application 
of Rule 37(g) that a party must have repeatedly violated court orders before a court may 
sanction a party under the rule. To take the Appellants' argument to its absurd conclusion, it 
http://ww^v.utcourts.gov/committees/civproc/20060222/ by clicking on the link for 
"Approved Minutes." 
5
 Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure April 26, 2006, 
Minutes at p. 2, available online at 
http://\^vw/\utcourts.gov/committees/civproc/20060426/ by clicking on the link for 
"Approved Minutes." (Emphasis added.) 
6
 U.R.C.P. Rule 37(b) provides as follows: "Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If 
a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on 
behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order 
made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard 
to the failure as are just, including the following:" 
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is as if Appellants argue that they could not be sanctioned under Rule 37(g) until they first 
repeatedly destroyed evidence — the same evidence being destroyed over and over in 
violation of a direct court order — in the case in violation of a direct court order. Such a 
ridiculous scenario would turn our system of justice on its head and give wrongdoers every 
incentive to destroy evidence. 
C T H E DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT T H E APPELLANTS 
INTENTIONALLY A N D PURPOSELY DESTROYED T H E 
COMPUTER EVIDENCE SUPPORTED T H E SANCTION OF 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Even though application of Rule 37(g) does not require a trial court to find that a 
party acted "willfully" in destroying evidence, the trial court found in its March 24, 2009, 
Memorandum Decision that Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe intentionally destroyed relevant 
evidence for the purpose of hiding potential damaging information, and that their actions 
demonstrated their disregard for the trial court and the judicial process. The trial court was 
therefore persuaded that their level of culpability warranted default judgment. (R. 663.) 
Earlier, in its November 14, 2008, preliminary injunction ruling, the trial court found as fact 
that Mr. Rowe and Mr. La Marr intentionally destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop computer and 
hard drive, which such intentional destruction "permanently deprives Mobilight and the 
Court of the evidence contained on the laptop computer." (R. 588, [^ 22.) The trial court 
also found in the preliminary injunction ruling that the Appellants "purposely" dropped the 
computer off the roof of DayNight's building. (R. 590, ^ 27.) 
There is no appreciable difference between a party acting "willfully" and one acting 
"intentionally" or "purposefully." The words are synonyms. "A willful act may be described 
as one done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as 
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distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently." Black's 
Law Dictionary 1599 (6th ed. 1990). Appellants acknowledge that the trial court found that 
that the Appellants "purposely" and ''intentionally" destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop, but 
cryptically argue nonetheless that "the evidence does not support that any intentional fault 
attributed to [the Appellants] was accompanied by the necessary additional willful behavior." 
Aplt. Brf. At 18-19. This is a distinction without a difference. Appellants do not contest 
that they purposely and intentionally destroyed the computer. 
D. T H E COMPUTER WAS N O T DESTROYED "IN GOOD FAITH." 
Mr. La Marr stated in the video that "We are about to destroy any final, potential 
harmful evidence that might link us to any sort of lawsuit to Mobilight regarding 
their concerns about intellectual property. (R. 662.) After the destruction of the laptop 
was complete, Appellants stated "Now, let's package it up and send it to Mobilight" and 
"OK. If this gets us into trouble, I hope we're prison buddies." (R. 492-493.) By their own 
words on the video, Appellants clearly communicated their state of mind in destroying the 
computer. Perhaps most importantly, Appellants knew the computer was evidence. 
Appellants knew they were doing something very wrong, and mocked Mobilight when they 
joked that they could send the destroyed computer to Mobilight. Appellants knew they were 
acting to take advantage of Mobilight in the litigation, which had begun with the filing of 
DayNight's complaint five days earlier on July 25, 2008. 
Appellants do not argue that they destroyed the computer as a result of a "routine, 
good-faith operation of an electronic information system [,]" which is the only "good faith" 
defense contained in Rule 37(g). Appellants' contention that they destroyed the laptop to 
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stop Mobilight from harassing DayNight is belied by the fact that five days before the laptop 
was destroyed, Appellant DayNight filed a complaint for trespass versus Mobilight. (R. R. 
1.) DayNight had already filed a court action to stop Mobilight's alleged harassment, and 
such action certainly imposed upon DayNight and its fellow Appellants a duty to preserve 
evidence. In addition, a duty to preserve relevant evidence arises at the point when a 
reasonable person has been put on notice of the potential for litigation. Computer Assoc. In?I, 
Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 169 (D. Colo. 1990) (Pre-litigation correspondence 
gave actual notice and created a duty to preserve.) Mobilight had earlier served a demand 
letter upon the Appellants, and that letter created a duty to preserve evidence. (R. 189-191.) 
Regardless of the Appellant's self-serving post-hoc explanations for their behavior, Appellants 
had a duty to preserve evidence.7 
Appellants' reliance on Kilpatrick for the proposition that Appellants acted 
"reasonably" given the circumstances is misplaced. In Kilpatrick, the district courts in the 
two cases dealt with the plaintiffs' failures to follow case management orders. Kilpatrick, 
2008 UT 82, \ 2. The plaintiffs were directed in the case management orders to obtain 
autopsies following the deaths of a plaintiff. Id. at |^ 3. The district court's decision 
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for failing to procure the required autopsies was reviewed 
under Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the district court 
Appellants' other explanation that they destroyed the computer "to show Mobilight that 
DayNight is not using the laptop" is hardly worth addressing. (Aplt. Brf. at 19.) It is very 
easy for any person to copy files from one computer to another through the use of CD-
ROM disks, memory "thumb drives," and even email attachments. Any electronic data files 
on Mr. Rowe's laptop could have easily been copied to a memory device or another 
computer, and once copied, destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop computer would not have 
prevented the Appellants from using the copied electronic data. 
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to sanction a party who "fails to obey an order" of the court during discovery "unless the 
court finds that the failure was substantially justified." Id. at j^ 22. In contrast, here, the 
district court applied Utah R. Civ. P. 37(g), which does not require that there be a pre-
existing order to trigger its application. Instead, Rule 37(g) is premised on the trial court's 
inherent authority to sanction the spoliation of evidence. The trial court in Kilpatrick made 
no factual findings as to willfulness, bad faith, or fault as to the claimants' failures to procure 
autopsies for their deceased husbands. Id. at J^ 26. Kilpatrick is also distinguishable because 
the plaintiffs in that case did not destroy evidence like the Appellants did in the case at bar. 
Here, the district court specifically found that the Appellants destroyed the computer 
evidence "purposefully" (R. 663) and "intentionally." (Id.) Such findings support the 
district court's decision to sanction Appellants with default judgment. 
The trial court carefully matched the severity of its default judgment sanction to the 
Appellants' state of mind at the time they destroyed the evidence. It is of no consequence 
that the trial court did not specifically find that the AppeUants acted with "willfulness." The 
trial court found that they acted "intentionally" and "purposely." 
E. T H E LAPTOP COMPUTER WAS T H E ESSENTIAL, CENTRAL 
EVIDENCE TO MOBILIGHT'S CASE. 
All of Mobilight's claims, against the Appellants that the district court granted 
Mobilight default judgment upon, center upon the electronic data that was contained on Mr. 
Rowes laptop. The relevant allegations contained in Mobilight's First Amended 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint are as follows: 
• Mobilight alleged in its First Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract against Mr. 
Rowe that he breached his Property Protection Agreement with Mobilight (i.e., his 
non-disclosure agreement) when he made unauthorized copies and disclosures of 
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Mobilight's Confidential Information to third parties and when he when he refused 
to return Mobilight's confidential information contained on the hard drive of his 
laptop computer. (R. 351, ^  129; R. 352, ^ 131.) 
• Mobilight alleged in its Second Claim for Relief for Breach of Duty of Loyalty 
against Mr. Rowe that he breached his continuing duty of loyalty to Mobilight when 
he disclosed Mobilight's Confidential Information to KK Machinery, DayNight, and 
Cactus Jack and other third parties and when he used Mobilight's Confidential 
Information in his employment with the KK Machinery/DayNight joint venture. (R. 
353, ^ j 136-137.) The Confidential Information included electronic data stored on 
the hard drive of Mr. Rowe's destroyed computer. 
• Mobilight alleged in its Third Claim for Relief for Conversion against Mr. Rowe that 
he converted Mobilight's computer files when he intentionally kept computer files 
belonging to Mobilight. (R. 354-355.) 
• Mobilight alleged in Fourth Claim for Relief against Mr. La Marr and KK 
Machinery that they breached their Property Protection Agreements with Mobilight 
(i.e., their non-disclosure agreements) when they, inter alia, made unauthorized copies 
and disclosures of Mobilight's Confidential Information and used Mobilight's 
Confidential Information in their work in the KK Machinery/DayNight joint 
venture. (R. 357, ^f 155-156.) The Confidential Information included electronic data 
stored on the hard drive of Mr. Rowe's destroyed computer. 
• Mobilight alleged in its Fifth Claim for Relief against KK Machinery that it 
breached its Distributor Agreement with Mobilight by using and disclosing 
Mobilight's confidential business information in its light tower joint venture with 
DayNight. (R. 358, |^ 162.) The confidential business information included 
electronic data stored on the hard drive of Mr. Rowe's destroyed computer. 
• Mobilight alleged in its Sixth Claim for Relief against Mr. Rowe, Mr. La Marr, KK 
Machinery and DayNight that they violated the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
U.C.A. § 13-24-1, et seq. (UUTSA), when they used Mobilight's trade secrets in the 
KK Machinery/DayNight joint venture in the design, manufacture and sale of light 
towers and when they disclosed the trade secrets to third parties. (R. 360, \ 168.) 
The trade secrets included electronic data stored on the hard drive of Mr. Rowe's 
destroyed computer. 
• Mobilight alleged in its Tenth Claim for Relief against Mr. Rowe, Mr. La Marr, KK 
Machinery, and DayNight that Mr. Rowe and Mr. La Marr that Mobilight should be 
granted injunctive relief and that those parties should be enjoined from working for 
the KK Machinery/DayNight joint venture pursuant to their respective agreements 
with Mobilight, pursuant to Mr. Rowe's continuing duty of loyalty to Mobilight, and 
pursuant to Mobilight's rights under the UUTSA. (R. 366, j^ 194.) As alleged in 
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Mobilight's First through Sixth Claims for relief, the electronic data stored on Mr. 
Rowe's destroyed computer was central to proving Mobilight's claim for injunctive 
relief. 
• Mobilight alleged in its Thirteenth Claim for Relief against Mr. Rowe, Mr. La Marr, 
KK Machinery, and DayNight for destruction of evidence under U.R.C.P. Rule 37(g) 
that Mobilight was entitled to default judgment for its First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Claims for relief due to the destruction of the laptop computer 
an hard drive. (R. 369-370.) 
Each of Mobilight's claims that the district court granted default judgment upon 
pertain, to a significant extent, to the electronic data evidence that would have been found 
on Mr. Rowe's destroyed laptop computer. Without that computer evidence, Mobilight 
cannot prove (and Appellants cannot disprove) exactly what electronic data comprising 
Mobilight's confidential proprietary information was contained on the computer. 
Appellants' argument that the laptop evidence is not necessary to proving Mobilight's 
trade secrets claims fails because Mobilight's Sixth Claim for Relief for violation of the 
UUTSA is centered on the computer evidence. Mobilight's rights under the UUTSA, 
Mobilight's agreements with the DayNight parties, and Mr. Rowe's duty of loyalty to 
Mobilight all relate directly to the security of Mobilight's confidential information contained 
in electronic data form. Misappropriation and unauthorized use of Mobilight's electronic 
data - regardless of how competitors actually use it - causes damage and irreparable harm to 
Mobilight and entitles it to relief. If an aggrieved party seeking relief under the UUTSA had 
to prove in every case that the trade secret information was used to virtually copy a 
manufactured product (and this is the crux of the argument Appellants proffer), then the 
UUTSA would be of little practical utility, because a wrongdoer could simply take trade 
secrets without authorization and either pass them on to a third party or make minor 
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changes to an end product's design to avoid liability. Indeed, under Utah case law as relied 
upon by the Appellants, an employer is entitled to relief for an employee's misappropriation 
of confidential information if the employee used or only intends to use the confidential 
information. Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-698 (Utah 1981). 
Regardless, the trial court found that despite the differences between the designs and 
specifications of the Mobilight light towers as compared to the DayNight prototype light 
towers, DayNight's prototype is a derivative of and sufficiently similar to Mobilight's light 
tower which established that "Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, and DayNight have //J-^/Mobilight's 
confidential proprietary information and trade secrets for their own benefits. (R. 591-592, \ 
591-592.) 
Here, the Appellants KK Machinery, DayNight, and Mr. La Marr never worked in 
the light tower industry before KK Machinery entered into the distribution agreement with 
Mobilight. (R. 587, \ 19.) Because those parties were new to the light tower industry, it is 
reasonable to assume that they needed and would have used Mobilight's confidential 
information to gain a foothold in the industry. 
In addition, although Appellants' argument appears to focus on Mobilight's 
confidential light tower design information, Mobilight has alleged that its confidential 
electronic data also included information regarding Mobilight's customers, vendors, costs, 
pricing, technical information regarding Mobilight's production methods, and Quickbooks 
financial information. (R. 351, \ 23.) All of that confidential information has special value 
to Mobilight, but is not directly related to the actual physical design and construction of light 
towers. Therefore, even though the DayNight prototype light tower may not have been an 
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exact copy of Mobilight's design, such circumstance does not mean that the Appellants did 
not misappropriate Mobilight's confidential electronic data regarding its customers, vendors, 
costs, etc. for the purpose of using it to unfairly compete against Mobilight. 
II. T H E DISTRICT COURT'S SANCTION OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS 
N O T "UNDDULY HARSH." 
Because of the prejudice inflicted on Mobilight, the interference with the judicial 
process, and the culpability of the Appellants, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
sanctioning the Appellants with default judgment. A court has the inherent authority to 
strike a party's pleadings and enter a default judgment if the party engages in conduct 
designed to improperly influence the court's decision on the merits of the case, such as 
perjury or obstruction of justice, or if the conduct itself tends to demonstrate bad faith or a 
lack of merit. Chen, 2005 UT 68, ^{43. 
While willfulness, bad faith and fault are not necessary to apply Rule 37(g), evidence 
of willfulness, bad faith, etc. is reviewed for the selection of the appropriate sanction. Courts 
often grant default judgment against wrongdoers for intentional destruction of evidence, 
including cases involving the destruction of computers and hard drives. E.g., Metropolitan 
Opera Ass'n., Inc. v. Yjocal 100> Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees In?l Union, 212 F.R.D. 
178, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (default judgment entered because party's destruction of computer 
records was willful and in bad faith); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Cop., 593 F. Supp. 
1443, 1455-56 (CD. Cal. 1984) (default judgment as punishment for the destruction of 
documents); Arista Records v. Tschirhart, 241 F.R.D. 462, 466 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (default 
judgment versus defendant for willfully destroying critical evidence from her computer after 
notice of lawsuit and showing blatant disregard for the judicial process); QZO, Inc. v. Moyer, 
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594 S.E.2d 541, 547 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (appellant reformatted computer hard drive prior 
to actual production, thereby destroying all evidence on the hard drive; sanction was striking 
pleadings and entering judgment); Kucala Enters., Ltd. v. Auto Wax Co., Inc., No. 02-C-1403, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8833 (N.D. 111. May 23, 2003) (plaintiffs action dismissed after 
plaintiff in bad faith used a computer program to delete documents from his computer and 
"clean" the hard drive); Computer Assoc'sIntl, 133 F.R.D. 166,171 (software developer 
defendant destroyed portions of developer's source code which such code could have shown 
developer had violated the plaintiffs copyright; court granted plaintiff default judgment as a 
sanction); Novell v. Timpanogos Research Group, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1197, 1211 (Utah 4th Dist. 
Ct , No. 970400339, Jan. 30, 1998) (copy of decision provided to the trial court at R. 621-
655). 
A. DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE 
MOBILIGHT SUFFERS SIGNFICANT PREJUDICE D U E TO T H E 
DESTROYED EVIDENCE. 
Here, default judgment was the appropriate sanction because of the prejudice 
Mobilight will suffer due to the destroyed evidence. Mobilight is prejudiced because without 
the laptop computer, Mobilight cannot prove what particular confidential information Mr. 
Rowe took from Mobilight and used or intended to use in the DayNight/KK Machinery 
joint venture. Ultimately, the jury and the trial court would have to speculate what 
confidential information was actually taken and used. Appellants argue that even assuming 
the laptop showed Mobilight's confidential information was on the hard drive, that 
Mobilight could not prove that such information was actually used. (Aplt. Brf. at 24.) This 
is not true, because through computer forensics it can be determined when particular 
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electronic data files are accessed, and any access of Mobilight confidential information from 
the computer could be determined — if only the computer had not been intentionally 
destroyed. 
Appellants' argument in reliance upon the Muna and Water & Energy Systems Tech., Inc. 
v. Keil, 1999 UT 16, 974 P.2d 821 cases, and the proposition in those cases that a court 
should compare the similarities and differences in manufactured products to determine if 
there has been trade secret misappropriation, actually underscores the prejudice Mobilight 
suffered from the computer's destruction. This is because if the factfinder becomes 
convinced that there are significant differences in the end products, Mobilight will not have 
the laptop computer evidence to also prove misappropriation. 
Even if the trial court would give Mobilight "a favorable inference in place of the 
evidence," as the Appellants suggest in their opening brief (Aplt. Brf. at 26), the jury will be 
left to speculate as to the quantity and quality of Mobilight's confidential electronic data 
regarding its manufacturing processes, customers, sales methods, business operations, 
financials, supply costs and pricing that existed on the laptop computer—all of which the 
Appellants could have accessed to compete with Mobilight and which the jury could 
consider in determining whether the Appellants misappropriated Mobilight's trade secrets 
and confidential information. That is exactly the position Appellants intended to put 
Mobilight in when they intentionally destroyed the coputer evidence, i.e., they wanted to 
force the factfinder to only speculate as to what confidential information they took from 
Mobilight and speculate as to what they did with it. Therefore, the only appropriate remedy 
is entry of default judgment as a sanction. 
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B. DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE 
DESTRUCTION OF T H E EVIDENCE INTERFERES WITH T H E 
JUDICIAL PROCESS. 
The trial court found that Appellants' actual videotaped destruction of the computer 
evidence created an extraordinary circumstance which demonstrated Mr. Rowe's and Mr. La 
Marr's disregard for the Court and the judicial process. (R. 663.) The judicial system is 
premised on the honesty and good faith efforts of the parties involved. SccQue/a v. Payco-
Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932, 2000 WL 656681, at *7 (N.D. 111. May 18, 
2000). Where honesty is replaced with falsehood, a party's right to litigate before a court 
comes into question. Id. 
Our system of justice depends upon parties' good-faith cooperation in preserving and 
presenting evidence for the resolution of disputes. When evidence is intentionally destroyed, 
the judicial process is compromised and short-circuited. Cases may then be decided on 
incomplete evidence, without the necessary consideration of the true facts underlying the 
claims. The justness of the final outcome is compromised. For these reasons, when a party 
unilaterally and intentionally alters or destroys the most central evidence in a case, default 
judgment is the most appropriate sanction. Here, the Appellants' callous disregard of the 
trial court and the judicial process warranted the sanction of default judgment. 
C. DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF T H E 
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF T H E APPELLANTS' 
CULPABILITY. 
Appellants argue that their explanations for destroying the laptop are reasonable 
given "their lack of sophistication and experience in corporate litigation matters." This 
argument rings hollow because Appellant DayNight was sophisticated enough to file its own 
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trespass lawsuit versus Mobilight on July 25, 2008, and was represented by counsel at the 
time the computer was destroyed on July 30, and ostensibly could have - and should have -
consulted with its counsel before destroying evidence. 
In addition, the DayNight parties argue they did not exercise bad faith in destroying 
the laptop because they have said they have not used Mobilight's information and because 
they have testified that they thought destroying the laptop would convince Mobilight to end 
its alleged "harassment." (Aplt. Brf. at 19.) Here, their actions in destroying the computer, 
and their efforts in hiding Mr. Rowe's early work for DayNight, speak louder than their 
words. Regardless, Mr. La Marr's and Mr. Rowe's own words, captured on the July 30, 2008 
destruction video, belie whatever stated intentions they now argue motivated their actions. 
There is no doubt there was "conscious wrongdoing" because Mr. La Marr himself said in 
the video that they were destroying "harmful evidence." Why? To prevent Mobilight and 
the Court from ever discovering the evidence. In addition, after the computer and hard 
drive were destroyed, they mentioned on the video the possibility of becoming "prison 
buddies" with each other. If they truly believed their actions were proper and their 
motivations were pure, why the references to destroying "harmful evidence" and becoming 
"prison buddies"? 
Likewise, there is ample evidence of the DayNight parties' bad faith in destroying the 
laptop. If the hard drive really contained "virtually all of DayNight's work product" as 
Appellants argue (Aplt. Brf. at 19), it then seems very likely that they took care to copy 
DayNight's own work product from the hard drive before they destroyed it, thus preserving 
their own material In stark contrast, just a few days after this litigation began, they admittedly 
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destroyed "harmful evidence" on the hard drive that they no doubt believed would help 
Mobilight prove its claims against them. Only after the laptop's destruction did they 
mockingly offer to give the computer to Mobilight. This evidence shows Appellants' bad 
faith, prompted by their desire to take an unfair advantage in this litigation. Entry of default 
judgment is therefore appropriate. See In re Wechsler, 121 F. Supp. 2d 404, 415 (D. Del. 
2000) (Willful or bad faith destruction of evidence intended to prevent other party from 
examining evidence warrants default judgment.) No alternative short of default judgment 
will adequately deter the DayNight parties and like-minded litigants from similar conduct. 
III. T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ERR IN AWARDING MOBILIGHT 
JUDGMENT FOR ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES A N D COSTS. 
The Second Affidavit of Rinehart L. Peshell sufficiently "apportioned" out the 
attorney's fees and costs incurred for work on the claims for relief upon which the trial court 
granted judgment. Mr. Peshell specified in his second affidavit that the attorney's fees and 
costs reflected in his affidavit pertained to the claims the trial court granted judgment upon, 
and that fees and costs related to the other claims were not included. (R. 786-787.) 
Mobilight's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Claims for 
Relief upon which the trial court granted Mobilight default judgment all pertain to the 
Appellants' misappropriation of Mobilight's confidential information. (R. 657.) The trial 
court made a specific finding that Mobilight had adequately apportioned its attorney's fees 
and costs in its supporting affidavits. (R. 833.) 
Two contracts in the litigation and U.R.C.P. Rule 37(b)(2)(D) provide Mobilight the 
grounds for the trial court's award of attorney's fees. Mobilight's Property Protection 
Agreement with KK Machinery and Mr. La Marr personally, and Mr. Rowe's separate 
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Property Protection Agreement with Mobilight, each contains the same clause in Paragraph 
No. 3 providing that if KK Machinery, Mr. La Marr, or Mr. Rowe breach their respective 
agreements, that Mobilight shall be entitled to attorney's fees and costs. (R. 374, f^ 3; R. 376, 
f^ 3.) In its ruling granting Mobilight a preliminary injunction against the Appellants, the trial 
court made a conclusion of law that the DayNight defendants had individually and/or 
collectively breached the specific provisions of their respective agreements with Mobilight, 
thereby entitling Mobilight to its attorney's fees and costs. (R. 596, [^ 1.) In addition, the 
trial court had authority to grant Mobilight its attorney's fees and costs by application of 
Rule 37(g) as the sanction provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(D) to "order the party or the attorney to 
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure [to preserve 
evidence] [.]" U.R.C.P, Rule 37(b)(2)(D). 
Comparison of Mobilight's counsel's first affidavit to the second affidavit clarifies the 
apportionment that was done. In the first affidavit, Mobilight's counsel specified that 
Mobilight had incurred $92,209.75 in legal fees pertaining to Mobilight's successful 
prosecution of its First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth claims for 
relief. (R. 686, ^| 3.) In Mobilight's counsel's second affidavit, counsel clarified that 
Mobilight had incurred $90,113.75 in legal fees pertaining to Mobilight's successful 
prosecution of its First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth claims for 
relief. (R. 784, |^ 3.) Mobilight's claimed expenses for expert fees and costs remained 
constant in both affidavits in the total amounts of $3,464.90 for costs and $27,113.42 for 
expert fees. (R. 686, ^ 3; R. 784, ^ 3.) Therefore, Mobilight claimed a total of $2,096.00 less 
in the second affidavit in comparison to the first affidavit, which lesser sum accounted for 
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the legal fees for work on claims Mobilight had not received default judgment upon that 
Mobilight had inadvertently included in counsel's first affidavit. The $2,096.00 difference 
reflected apportionment for "(3) claims for which there is not entitlement for attorney's 
fees," as required in Ellsworth Paulson Construction Co. v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353, f 
47, 144 P.3d 261, as relied upon by Appellants. The $90,113.75 amount reflected "(1) 
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees[.]" Id. 
The subtraction of the $2,096.00 in attorney's fees in the second affidavit constituted 
the apportionment to be done for "(2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been 
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful" and "(3) claims for which 
there is no entitlement to attorney's fees" per Ellsworth. At the time of counsel's second 
affidavit, Mobilight was not conclusively "unsuccessful" as to any claim in the action, 
because all the claims in the case besides the several that the trial court granted Mobilight 
default judgment upon had not been tried or finally decided. Likewise, as to "(3) claims for 
which there is no entitlement to attorney fees," a party need not separate out its 
compensable and non-compensable claims to the extent that they sufficiently overlap, 
involving the same nucleus of facts. Truong v. Holmes, 2009 UT App 212, ^ [ 12-13, citing 
Dejawe, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, ^ 20, 993 P.2d 222 (stating that where 
litigation involves a contractual prevailing party attorney fee provision and includes "multiple 
claims involving a common core of facts and related legal theories,. . . [the party] prevailing] 
on at least some of its claims ... is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in the litigation"). Here, Mobilight received default judgment for its Second Claim 
for Relief for Breach of Duty of Loyalty against Mr. Rowe (R. 353), and its Third Claim for 
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Relief for Conversion against Mr. Rowe (R. 354), and its Fifth Claim for Relief for Breach of 
Contract involving the KK Machinery Distributor Agreement (R. 358), its Tenth Claim for 
Relief for Injunctive Relief against all the DayNight parties (R. 366), and its Thirteenth Claim 
for Relief for Destruction of Evidence against all the DayNight parties. (R. 369.) There is 
no provision for attorney's fees applicable to any of those claims. However, each of those 
listed claims is inextricably tied to the other claims Mobilight was granted default judgment 
upon and which entide Mobilight to an award of attorney's fees and costs, i.e., its First Claim 
for Relief for Breach of Contract (Property Protection Agreement) against Mr. Rowe (Tr. 
350), its Fourth Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract (Property Protection Agreement) 
against Mr. La Marr and KK Machinery (Tr. 356.), and its Sixth Claim for Relief for violation 
of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act against all the DayNight Parties (Tr. 360.) The 
Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Claims for Relief all involve a common nucleus 
of facts and theories that overlap with the First, Fourth, and Sixth Claims for Relief. 
Therefore, pursuant to Truong, Mobilight did not have to separate out its compensable and 
non-compensable claims. 
The invoice supporting Mobilight's counsel's second affidavit for attorney's fees and 
costs cut out a number of entries in which Mobilight's counsel had inadvertendy included in 
the invoice supporting counsel's first affidavit regarding fees for work on claims that 
Mobilight had not been granted default judgment. For example, comparison for the entry of 
attorney Rinehart Peshell's time on July 30, 2008, shows that his time was reduced from 1.5 
hours to 1.3 hours to account for time mistakenly attributed to time spent working on 
DayNight's trespass lawsuit versus Mobilight, and the description of work for Mr. Peshell's 
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conference with Appellant's attorney Rick Ensor regarding DayNight's trespass claim was 
cut out. (Compare R. 692 to R. 791.) For another example, comparison of the entry of 
Attorney Rinehart Peshell's time on August 8, 2008, shows that his time was reduced from 
1.50 hours to 1.40 hours, and the 0.1 hour spent working on Mobilight's Answer to 
DayNight's Complaint was cut out.8 (Compare R. 692 to R. 791.) Thus, comparison of the 
first and second affidavits and the invoices supporting the affidavits confirms that 
apportionment of fees was done. 
The Appellant's main contention regarding the attorney's fee award pertains to the 
alleged lack of explicit categorization of time and fees for "successful claims" for which 
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, "unsuccessful claims" for which there would 
have been an entidement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and "claims for 
which there is not an entidement to attorney fees." (Aplt. Brf. at 27.) Importandy, 
Appellants do not argue that the attorney's fee award for the work done by Mobilight's 
counsel is excessive or otherwise unreasonable in light of the work done in the case and the 
result achieved. Because the affidavits in support of attorney's fees included sufficient 
apportionment and the remainder of the record contained sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's award for attorney's fees and costs, and because any error in the trial court's 
8
 Other time for work done on claims not included in the default judgment that were 
inadvertendy listed in the invoice accompanying Mr. Peshell's first affidavit and were 
removed in the invoice accompanying his second affidavit are found in entries for 
November 5, 2008 for Mr. Peshell (compare R. 693 to R. 793), entries for November 10 and 
14, 2008 for attorney Richard Matheson (compare R. 696 to R. 795), and entries for May 29 
(Compare R. 697 to R. 796); July 22, 23, 25, 28, 31 (Compare R. 697-698 to r. 797-798); 
August 1, 4, 8, 12, 20 (Compare R. 698-699 to R. 798-799); and November 6 and 10 
(Compare R. 708-709 to R. 808) for attorney Jonathon Party. 
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award of attorney's fees and costs was harmless, the award for attorney's fees and costs 
contained in the Final Judgment should be affirmed. 
A. T H E ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD IS SUPPORTED BY T H E 
EVIDENCE IN T H E RECORD. 
Here, the vast majority of activity on the case up until the time of the judgment award 
was focused on the eight claims upon which the trial court granted Mobilight summary 
judgment. To the extent Mobilight's counsel spent time working on the other claims, that 
time was not included in the Second Affidavit of Rinehart Peshell. Mr. Peshell specifically 
testified in his second affidavit as follows: 
12. All of the attorneys fees and costs included in the invoice attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" were expended for the prosecution of the claims for 
which Mobilight is entided to attorneys fees (the First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims for Relief of Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First 
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (the trade secret-related 
claims)) and in preparation for enforcement of judgment for Mobilight on 
those claims. None of the attorneys fees or costs included in the attached invoice pertain to 
work performed on the other claims contained in Mobilight's First Amended Counterclaim 
and Third-Party Complainty nor with respect to the claims alleged by the DayNight parties 
versus Mobilight 
(R. 786-787, \ 12.) (Emphasis added.) Mr. Peshell further testified that the attorneys fees 
and costs that accrued after November 14, 2008, included fees related to obtaining the 
Court's sanctions order, opposing the DayNight parties' attempted interlocutory appeal of 
the Court's Preliminary Injunction Order, and dealing with the DayNight parties' attempt to 
remove the DayNight prototype light tower evidence out of the jurisdiction. (R. 787,1J13.) 
Mr. Preshell further testified that the work of the private investigator and the charges 
incurred for Lexis legal research costs, as reflected on the invoice, were incurred in direct 
relation to Mobilight's trade secret-related claims. (R. 787, ]fl[ 14-15.) 
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The trial court held an oral argument hearing on September 21, 2009, pertaining to 
Mobilight's Motion for Entry of Judgment, including the issue of the award of attorney's 
fees and costs, and reserved its ruling. (R. 829.) 
Appellants complain that Mr. Peshell failed in his affidavit to specifically apportion 
fees and costs incurred in litigating Mobilight's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Tenth, and Thirteenth Claims for Relief in comparison to the other unresolved claims in the 
case. (Aplt. Brf. 27-28.) However, the purpose of his second affidavit was to correct the 
record following his first affidavit for attorney's fees and costs, in which Mobilight's law firm 
mistakenly included some attorney's fees for claims unrelated to the eight claims upon which 
the trial court granted judgment. (See R. 685-689.) Mobilight pointed out this error in its 
reply brief in support of its motion for entry of final judgment. (R. 776.) Therefore, with 
the record corrected, the evidence supported the trial court's award for attorney's fees and 
costs in the amount of $120,692.07. There was no further apportionment that could be 
completed beyond that included in counsel's second affidavit. 
The cases Appellants rely upon for their argument regarding the requirement for 
evidence of apportionment are distinguishable. For example, in El/sworfh, the case went 
through a full bench trial, which decided all claims between the parties. 2006 UT App 353, ^ | 
9. In addition, the court there found that the breach of contract claim (for which there was 
no recovery for attorney's fees) was so inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claim (for 
which there was statutory authority for recovery of attorney's fees) as to warrant grouping 
those fees together. Id., |^ 47. In comparison, the remaining claims in this case have not 
gone to trial. The record as a whole reflects that Mobilight's counsel spent very little time, if 
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any, working on the remaining claims and did not include them in Mr. PeshelTs second 
affidavit. Virtually all the attorney's fees and costs that plaintiffs and Mobilight incurred 
from the beginning of the case up through the time of the entry of the Final Judgment were 
devoted to litigation of Mobilight's trade secret and spoliation claims. The remaining claims 
in the case (i.e., those pertaining to KK Machinery's third-party counterclaims versus 
Mobilight and Ross Johnson, and Mobilight's counterclaims versus KK Machinery) were left 
essentially untouched up until the trial court's entry of the Final Judgment. When almost all, 
if not all, of the legal services devoted to a case are necessary and relevant with respect to 
issues a party succeeds upon for which it is entitled to attorney's fees, there is no error if 
there is imperfect allocation of attorney's fees. See Burton Lumber <& Hardware Co. v. Graham, 
2008 UT App 207, \ 31,186 P.3d 1012. 
To further distinguish Appellants' cases, in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1992), the record was "sparse," as the attorney's fee affidavit failed to delineate such 
basic information as the nature of the work performed, the amount of attorney time 
expended, and the hourly billing rate. Id. at 269. Here, Mobilight's counsel submitted a 
detailed affidavit with an attached invoice including precise descriptions of the work 
performed, the amount of attorney time expended, and the hourly billing rates. 
Finally, in Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998), also went all the way through to 
trial. Id. at 54. The contract at issue in that case only authorized fees to be collected for time 
expended in remedying a default in the purchase agreement, but the attorney's affidavit 
included several entries of fees for services relating to the noncontract, tortious interference 
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claims. Id. at 55-56. Here, Mobilight's counsel's affidavit did not include time for claims not 
pertaining to the successful default judgment claims. 
B. T H E TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY CONSIDERED A N D 
F O U N D THAT MOBILIGHT'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES WAS SUFFICIENTLY APPORTIONED A N D THAT T H E 
AMOUNT INCURRED WAS REASONABLE. 
The trial court made plain in its November 10, 2009, Memorandum Decision 
granting the Final Judgment that the court had carefully reviewed Mobilight's counsel's 
affidavits in support of the requested attorney's fees and costs award, and was satisfied that 
the "apportioned" amount of fees sought was appropriate, and that the amount of fees and 
costs requested were reasonable in light of the complexity of the case and scope of litigation. 
The trial court stated as follows: 
After reviewing counsel's Affidavits regarding fees and the attached statements, the 
Court determines that the apportioned amount of fees sought is appropriate and 
necessarily incurred in furtherance of Mobilight's trade secret-related claims. Further, 
as attested to in counsel's Second Affidavit, at least a portion of the fees incurred 
related to apparent attempts to remove certain evidence out of this jurisdiction. 
These actions necessitated investigatory work and monitoring of the parties to ensure 
compliance with the Court's Orders. Overall, the Court determines that Mobilight is 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs and that the amount of such fees and costs 
requested are reasonable in light of the complexity of this case and the scope of the 
litigation. 
(R. 833.) (Emphasis added.) 
C. ANY TECHNICAL DEFICIENCY IN APPORTIONMENT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN T H E SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS WAS 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
Because the record confirms that the trial court carefully reviewed Mobilight's 
application for attorney's fees and costs, and found that the attorney's fees were adequately 
apportioned, any technical deficiency in Mobilight's affidavits and the trial court's 
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consideration of those affidavits with respect to specific claims for relief in the case was 
harmless. Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Spillers, 2007 
UT 13, ^ | 24, 152 P.3d 315. Harmless error analysis applies to awards for attorney's fees. See 
Hallv. NACMIntemountain, 1999 UT 97, fflf 20-21, 988 P.2d 942. Indeed, an appellate court 
may uphold a fee award when no findings of fact have been entered on the record when it 
would be reasonable to assume that such findings actually had been made. Foote, 962 P.2d at 
56, citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah Dec. 5, 1997).9 
Here, the trial court noted in its November 10, 2009, Memorandum Decision that it 
reviewed the second affidavit of Mobilight's counsel submitted in support of Mobilight's 
request for judgment for its attorney's fees and costs, and that the plaintiffs had argued that 
Mobilight had allegedly failed to properly apportion its fees and had allegedly provided only 
"vague and unclear" descriptions of the underlying legal work. (R. 833.) Therefore, there is 
no doubt that the trial court was aware of and thoroughly considered the issue. 
9
 In cases in which factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by the trial court but 
no findings . . . appear in the record, we "assume that the trier of facts found them in accord 
with its decision, and we affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to 
find facts to support it." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah Dec. 5,1997), 
citing State v. Kamire^ 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (quoting Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 
245 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1952)) (additional citations omitted). Under Ramire^ "this court 
upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." 817 P.2d at 788 n.6. 
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IV. MOBILIGHT IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES A N D COSTS 
O N APPEAL. 
Mobilight respectfully requests the Court grant Mobilight its attorney's fees and costs 
incurred with respect to Appellants' appeal. As noted supra, Mobilight is entitled to its 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to its successful prosecution of its statutory trade secret 
claim, pursuant to the attorney's fees and costs provision in its Property Protection 
Agreement with Mr. La Marr and KK Machinery, its successful UUTSA claim, and pursuant 
to Rule 37(b)(2)(D). The contractual obligation to pay attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a 
contract should include those incurred on appeal. Management Sews. Corp. v. Development 
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 - 409 (Utah 1980). "[W]hen a party who received attorney fees 
below prevails on appeal, 'the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.'" 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (quoting Utah Dep't ofSoc. Sews. v. Adams, 
806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Here, Mobilight received judgment for its 
attorney's fees, and it is entitled to its attorney's fees on appeal should the Court affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted within its discretion in applying Rule 37(g) and imposing default 
judgment against the DayNight Parties as sanction against the DayNight Parties for the 
intentional destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop computer. The trial had the inherent authority 
to issue the sanction, the severity of which was appropriate given Mr. La Marr's and Mr. 
Rowe's bad faith and intentional conduct. 
The trial court also acted within its discretion in granting Mobilight final judgment in 
the amount of $120,692.07 for the reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs it incurred 
in obtaining the default judgment. Mobilight's request for attorney's fees was supported by 
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affidavit that apportioned fees as required. The trial court explicitly stated it considered the 
issue of attorney's fees, found that there was appropriate apportionment, and found that the 
fees were reasonable. 
Accordingly, the Final Judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this^z: day of August, 2010. 
MATHESON & PESHELL, LLC 
Rir 
Richard M. Matheson 
Jonathon D. Party, Of Counsel 
Attorneys for Appellee Mobi-Ught, Inc. 
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565 COMMERCE AND TRADE 13-24-8 
(i) a cease and desist order; and 
(ii) an administrative fine of u p to $2,500 for each 
separate violation that is not a violation described in 
Subsection 13-23~5(2){e) up to $10,000 for any series 
of violations arising out of the same operative facts, 
(b) All administrative fines collected under this chapter 
shall be deposited in the Consumer Protection Education 
and Training Fund created in Section 13-2-8. 3oo5 
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Preservation of secrecy. 
Sta tute of limitations. 
Effect on other law. 
Uniformity of application and construction. 
Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Trade Secrets Act." 
18-24-2, Definitions. 
As used in this chapter, unless the context requires other-
wise: 
(1) "Improper means* includes theft, bribery, misrepre-
sentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other 
means, 
(2) "Misappropriation" means: 
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a 
person who knows or has reason to know tha t tha 
t rade secret was acquired hy improper means; or 
(b) disclosure or use of a t rade secret of another 
without express or implied consent by a person who: 
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge 
of the trade secret; or 
(ii) a t the time of disclosure or use, knew or 
had reason to know tha t his knowledge of the 
t rade secret was: 
(A) derived from or through a person who 
had utilized improper means to acquire it; 
(B) acquired under circumstances giving 
rise to a duty to maintain i ts secrecy or limit 
its use; or 
(C) derived from or through a person who 
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to 
maintain its secrecy or limit i ts use; or 
(iii) before a material change of his position, 
knew or had reason to know t h a t it was a trade 
secret and that knowledge of it had been ac-
quired by accident or mistake, 
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, busi-
ness t rus t , estate, trust , partnership, association, joint 
venture, government, governmental subdivision or 
agency, or any other legal or commercial entity, 
(4) "Trade .secret" means information, including a for-
mula, pat tern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable hy proper means by, other 
persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
1989 
13-24-3. Injunctive relief. 
(1) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. 
Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be termi-
nated when the t rade secret has ceased to exist, bu t the 
injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable 
period of time in order to eliminate Commercial advantage 
tha t otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation. 
(2) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condi-
tion future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no 
longer than the period of time for which use could have been 
prohibited. Exceptional circumstances include, bu t are not 
limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior 
to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation 
tha t renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable. 
(3) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect 
a trade secret may be compelled by court order. 198» 
13-24-4. D a m a g e s . 
(1) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial 
change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to 
know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery ineq-
uitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for 
misappropriation. Damages can include both t h e actual loss 
caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused 
by misappropriation tha t is not taken into account in comput-
ing actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by any other 
methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be 
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for 
a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a t rade 
secret. 
(2) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the 
court may award exemplary damages in an amount not 
exceeding twice any award made under Subsection (1). xsss 
18-24-5. Attorneys'fees. 
If a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion 
to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or 
willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may 
award reasonable attorneys* fees to the prevailing party. 1989 
13-24-6. Preservation of secrecy. 
In an action under this chapter, a court shall preserve the 
secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which 
may include granting protective orders in connection with 
discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing 
the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in 
the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without 
prior court approval. isss 
13-24-7. Statute of limitations. 
An action for misappropriation shall be brought within 
three years after the misappropriation is discovered or, by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered. 
For the purposes of this section, a continuing misappropria-
tion constitutes a single claim. i»8& 
13-24-8, Effect on other law, 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this chapter dis-
places conflicting tort , restitutionary, and other law of this 
state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a t rade 
secret. 
(2) This chapter does not affect: 
(a) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon 
misappropriation of a trade secret; 
(b) other civil remedies that are not based upon misap-
propriation of a t r ade secret; or 
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(c) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon mis-
appropriation of a trade secret. 1989 
13-24-9, Uniformity of application and construction. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 
subject of the chapter among states enacting it. i98d 
CHAPTER 25 
AUTOMATED DIALING TELEPHONE SOLICITATION 
[EEPEALEDj 
13-25-1 to 13-25-5. Repealed. laae 
CHAPTER 25a 




13-25a-103. Prohibited conduct for telephone solicitations 
— Exceptions. 
13-25a-104. Prohibited conduct for facsimiles — Excep-
tions. 
13-25a-105. Penalties — Administrative and criminal. 
13-25a-lG6. Enforcement. 
13-25a-lG7, Private action. 
13-25a-107.2. Requests to a specific telephone solicitor. 
13-25a~108, Objections to telephone solicitations. 




This chapter is known as the "Telephone and Facsimile 
Solicitation Act* 1996 
13-25a-102» Definitions, 
As used in this chapter; 
(1) "Advertisement" means material offering for sale, 
or advertising the availability or quality of, any property, 
goods, or services, , 
(2) (a) "Automated telephone dialing system" means 
equipment used to: 
(i) store or produce telephone numbers; 
(ii) call a stored or produced number; and 
(iii) connect the number called with a recorded 
message or artificial voice, 
(b) "Automated telephone dialing system" does not 
include equipment used with a burglar alarm system, 
voice messaging system, fire alarm system, or other 
system used in an emergency involving the immedi-
ate health or safety of a person. 
(3) "Division" means the Division of Consumer Protec-
tion in the Department of Commerce. 
(4) (a) "Established business relationship* means a 
relationship that: 
(i) is based on inquiry, application, purchase, 
or transaction regarding products or services 
offered; 
(ii) is formed by a voluntary two-way commu-
nication between a person making a telephone 
solicitation and a person to whom a telephone 
solicitation is made; and 
(iii) has not been terminated by: 
(A) an act by either party; or 
(B) the passage of 18 months since the 
most xecent inquiry, application, purchase, 
transaction, or voluntary two-way communi-
cation, 
(b) "Established business relationship'5 includes a 
relationship with an affiliate as defined in Section 
16-10a-102. 
(5) "Facsimile machine" means equipment used for. 
(a) scanning or encoding text or images for conver-
sion into electronic signals for transmission; or 
(b) receiving electronic signals and reproducing 
them as a duplicate of the original text or image. 
(6) "Negative response" means a statement from a 
party stating the party does not wish to listen to the sales 
presentation or participate in the solicitation presented in 
the telephone call. 
(7) "Telephone solicitation" means the initiation of a 
telephone call or message for a commercial purpose or to 
seek a financial donation, including calls: 
(a) encouraging the purchase or rental of, or in-
vestment in, property, goods, or services, regardless 
of whether the transaction involves a nonprofit orga-
nization; 
(b) soliciting a sale of or extension of credit for 
property or services to the person called; 
(c) soliciting information that will be used for: 
(i) the direct solicitation of a sale of property 
or services to the person called; or 
(ii) an extension of credit to the person called 
for a sale of property or services; or 
(d) soliciting a charitable donation involving the 
exchange of any premium, prise, gift, ticket, subscrip-
tion, or other benefit in connection with any appeal 
made for a charitable purpose. 
(8) "Telephone solicitor" means any natural person, 
firm, organization, partnership, association, or corpora-
tion who makes or causes to be made an unsolicited 
telephone call, including calls made by use of an auto-
mated telephone dialing system. 
(9) "Unsolicited telephone calF means a telephone call 
for a commercial purpose or to seek a financial donation 
other than a call made: 
(a) in response to an express request of the person 
called; 
(b) primarily in connection with an existing debt or 
contract, payment or performance of which has not 
been completed at the time of the call; 
(c) to any person with whom the telephone solicitor 
has an established business relationship; or 
(d) as required by law for a medical purpose. 2003 
13~25a-103. Prohibited conduct for telephone solicita-
tions — Exceptions. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a person may not 
operate or authorize the operation of an automated telephone 
dialing system to make a telephone solicitation. 
(2) A person may operate an automated telephone dialing 
system if a call is made: 
(a) with the prior express consent of the person who is 
called agreeing to receive a telephone solicitation from a 
specific solicitor; or 
(b) to a person with whom the solicitor has an estab-
lished business relationship, 
(3) A person may not make a telephone solicitation to a 
residential telephone without prior express consent during 
any of the following times: 
(a) before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. local time; 
(b) on a Sunday; or 
(c) on a legal holiday. 
(4) A person may not make or authorize a telephone solici-
tation in violation of Title 47 U.S.C. 227. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAYNIGHT, LLC, a Utah limited 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
liability company, 
s CASE NO- 080913997 
Plaintiff & Counterclaim 
Defendant, : 
vs. : 
MOBI-LIGHT, INC., a Utah ? 
corporation, 
Defendant & Counterclaim 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. * 
KICK MACHINERY PTY, LTD., a foreign : 
corporation, W. CORY ROWE, an 
individual, and PAUL "CACTUS JACK" J 
LA MARR, an individual, 
Third Party Defendants. 
vs. 
MOBILIGHT, INC., and ROSS JOHNSON, 
Third Party Counterclaim 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on September 21, 2009, 
in connection with defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Mobi-Light, 
Inc.'s {"Mobilight") Motion for Entry of Final Judgment. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the .matter under advisement to 
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further consider the relevant legal authorities, the parties' written 
submissions and counsel's oral argument. Being now fully informed, the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The first issue raised by Mobilight's Motion is whether 
certification of the Final Judgment is appropriate under Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mobilight has cited the Court to a 
number of decisions which have discussed the requirements of Rule 54(b) 
and the' Court has now had an opportunity to review those cases* The 
plaintiff and counterclaim defendants (these parties are collectively 
referred to as the "plaintiff") does not dispute that the principal 
requirements of Rule 54 (b) have been met because there are multiple 
claims for relief and multiple parties. However, it argues that the 
Court should exercise its discretion in denying certification because the 
claims which remain stem from the same core set of facts and cannot be 
considered separate from the claims upon which Mobilight requests entry 
of Pinal Judgment. The Court is not persuaded by this argument and 
determines that the claims remaining in this case do not overlap 
factually or legally with the claims that Mobilight seeks Judgment upon. 
Further, the Court expressly determines that there is ho just reason for 
delay. Accordingly, Mobilight's request for Rule 54(b) certification is 
granted> 
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The next issue raised by Mobilight's Motion concerns the amount of 
attorney's fees sought by Mobilight. The plaintiff initially argued that 
Mobilight has failed to properly apportion its fees and has provided only 
vague and unclear descriptions of the underlying legal work. Subsequent 
to the plaintiff's filing of its Opposition, Mobilight provided a Second 
Affidavit regarding attorney's fees and costs which apportions and limits 
the fees requested to the trade secret-related claims. Nevertheless, the 
plaintiff maintains that the basis for apportionment remains unclear. 
The plaintiff also challenges research and other work performed after the 
preliminary injunction. 
After reviewing counsel's Affidavits regarding fees and the attached 
statements, the Court determines that the apportioned amount of fees 
sought is appropriate and necessarily incurred in furtherance of 
Mobilight's trade secret-related claims. Further, as attested to in 
counsel's Second Affidavit, at least a portion of the fees incurred 
related to apparent attempts to remove certain evidence out of this 
jurisdiction. These actions necessitated investigatory work and 
monitoring of the parties to ensure compliance with the Court's Orders. 
Overall, the Court determines that Mobilight is entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees and costs and that the amount of such fees and costs 
requested are reasonable in light of the complexity of this case and the 
scope of the litigation. 
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The final issue raised by Mobilight's Motion is whether Mobilight 
should be granted a permanent injunction. The plaintiff contends that 
the proposed Final Judgment is broadly worded and could be construed as 
virtually prohibiting DayNight, LLC, from working in the light tower 
industry for an indefinite amount of time. The Court concludes that the 
form of the Final Judgment has the requisite specificity and properly 
focuses on the use or disclosure of trade secrets. Consistent with the 
Court's prior decisions, the Court determines that there is a "cognizable 
danger" that the plaintiff may further misappropriate Mobilight's trade 
secrets in the future, particularly since the trade secrets which were 
misappropriated were contained in an electronic format. See ClearOne 
Communications, Inc. v. Chiang, 608 F.Supp.2d 1270 (D. Utah 2009). 
Accordingly, the Court enters a permanent injunction as requested in the 
proposed Final Judgment. As a corollary, the Court grants Mobilight's 
Motion for Order Exonerating T.R.O. Bond. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
granting Mobilight's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment. The Court will 
require Mobilight to resubmit the proposed Final Judgment and Order 
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Exonerating T.R.O. Bond within five (5) days of service of this 
Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this 10 day of November, 2009. 
2* 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE/" 
•S2£ 
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